The agreement provides for various procedures for the commissioning of public institutions, the most important of which are the main ones: within the framework of the agreement, the two sides committed to activate the role of all state authorities and institutions in southern Yemen, to reorganize the armed forces under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, reorganize the security forces under the leadership of the Interior Ministry, as well as an end to all offensive media campaigns aimed at normalizing relations between the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and the UAE-backed STC. All parties will benefit politically from the reactivated Riyadh agreement. President Hadi is taking advantage of this because the STC maintains an agreement that explicitly recognizes its side as Yemen`s only legitimate government at the international level. And although the STC must withdraw from self-management, it can place one of its own in the seat of the governor of Aden and will join Hadi in the latest UN-led negotiations with the Houthis. This is probably the best thing both sides can hope for, as neither side was able to defeat the other on the southern battlefield. Opponents of the STC often reduce the group to a mere alternate from the UAE, which continues to fund and support some of its political operations, but this does not refer to the popular support the STC has in its communities. The Hadi government and loyalist supporters continue to ignore protests in the southern region to support the STC and overplay those who support Hadi. Much of this propaganda undermines the prospects for a genuine implementation of an agreement. Moreover, the updating of the STC does not bode well for Yemen, as it deepens political marginalization. In addition, the Hadi government cannot request the demilitarization of the armed forces allied to stC, as it is unable to protect the south from Houthi military attacks. Clashes with Houthi forces continue in Dhala and the Houthis have carried out drone strikes against targets in the south. In addition, the lack of political representation and economic malaise – despite an abundance of resources in the South – is one of the biggest dysfunctions of the STC. The failure to understand the marginalization that engulfed the South after unification with the North in 1990 and the exploitation and oppression that followed after the 1994 civil war widened the gap between communities and were a major mobilizer of the Cause of the South.
Other deep disagreements also persist – for example, the STC statement of July 29 does not even mention the Hadi government, whose own official statements on this subject have sharply highlighted the “unity” of Yemen. Nevertheless, the mechanism could still be a great asset by unlocking some aspects of the long-stalled Riyadh agreement, such as the formation of a common government and the prevention of further military clashes within the coalition. It could also allow coalition members to refocus on their common adversary, perhaps through more concerted efforts to roll back attempts by the Houthis to seize more territory. Finally, successful implementation would allow Saudi Arabia to have much-needed diplomatic work, allowing its leaders to focus on talks with the Houthis and support UN negotiations to end the entire war in Yemen. . . .